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Here is a typical true cartel story. For twenty years two major 
firms dominated the Australian freight express business – which 
transports parcels and packages from one city to another. They 
had a secret agreement that assigned customers (called ‘pets’) 
exclusively to one or the other. They agreed not to poach pets 
from one another. If customers tried to switch suppliers, the 
competitor would quote a high price and that would usually 
be the end of the matter. Occasionally, however, a customer 
would switch supplier but then receive very bad service: urgent 
overnight deliveries from Melbourne to Sydney would arrive 
several thousand miles away in Darwin a few days later or get 
lost. In the jargon of the companies they were trying to ‘burn’ 
customers to induce them to switch back. If burning failed 
the firm would try to compensate its competitor by getting rid 
of one of its existing customers of like size by sharply rising 
prices or by reducing service quality. Occasionally financial 
compensation was paid instead. All this was done to avoid 
competition and raise prices.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) successfully broke up the arrangement and with much 
fanfare had the firms fined about $AUD13million. 
There were occasional attempts by new competitors to enter the 
profitable market. However, whenever this happened, at least 
one of the firms would quote prices well below that of the new 
entrant. They often quoted prices that were well below their 
costs: if the variable or marginal cost of overnight delivery 
between Melbourne and Sydney was $50 then they would 
quote at $30. This drove most competitors out of the market. 
Legal action to recover damages under the competition law was 
eventually taken by one of the surviving competitors.
After the cartel was broken up one of the players came to the 
Commission and claimed that there was only room for one 
firm in the market. Could they merge? If so a great deal of 
duplication would be eliminated, cost savings would occur and 
the customer ultimately would benefit from lower prices. The 
combined firm would also have the scale to enter into overseas 
markets. However, from the ACCC’s perspective, such a merger 
seemed anticompetitive, and would have been likely to cause 
higher prices. So the ACCC opposed the suggestion.
Yet as serious competition broke out the ACCC received 
some information from people within one of the firms which 
suggested that the advertised claims that packages were 
transported by air from one capital city to another were 
incorrect. The ACCC tested this by sending some packages of 
its own which included altimeters. On collecting the packages 
the altimeters showed that at no stage had the parcel been 
more than 300 metres above sea level indicating either that the 
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planes tended to fly rather low or that there was misleading 
and deceptive conduct in breach of the consumer protection 
provisions of the Trade Practices Act. 
Let Us Draw Some General 
Conclusions
Cartels – secret agreements between competitors not to 
compete, to raise prices, to restrict service – are a great 
temptation for business. The gains can be large. The global 
vitamins cartel ran for nine years, raised prices by seventy five 
per cent and made billions around the world for the conspirators. 
Cartels are also hard to detect increasing the incentive to operate 
them. However, they do great economic harm – to business 
customers and consumers – bring no offsetting economic or 
social benefits and are unethical. In most OECD countries 
including Australia it is unlawful for competitors to agree to 
share a market so that they do not compete against one another. 
It is also unlawful for them to agree on prices or to rig bids. 
Anticartel laws are a core component of competition law. 
To cut prices in response to a new competitor is not generally 
unlawful. This is competition at work. However, to cut prices 
persistently below variable cost to eliminate a competitor is 
usually ‘predatory’ and unlawful. Predatory behaviour breaches 
abuse of market power (or abuse of dominance) provisions 
of competition law. In Australia it is unlawful for a firm with 
a substantial degree of power in a market to take advantage 
of that power in order to eliminate competitors or deter them 
from competing where this harms competition. There is 
nothing wrong with being a monopoly under competition law – 
monopoly may be the result of a business being more efficient 
than its competitors. It is, however, unlawful in most OECD 
countries to engage in acts of ‘monopolisation’ or ‘abuse of 
dominance’ that is to use market power illegitimately to prevent 
competition, for example:
• by systematically pricing below variable cost to destroy 
small players or new entrants; 
• by refusing to supply where the purpose or effect is to lessen 
competition;
• by engaging in a range of restrictive practices such as 
exclusive dealing (supplying a customer on the condition 
that it does not purchase from a competitor) where this is 
anticompetitive;
• by engaging in resale price maintenance (requiring a retail 
purchaser not to sell below a specified minimum price). 
Such anticompetitive behaviour by business harms competition, 
efficiency, business opportunity and innovation. Such behaviour 
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(‘monopolisation’ in US jargon) has been unlawful in North 
America since the time of Rockefeller and is still so as Mr Gates 
has discovered in the Microsoft case. It is, however, a field in 
which difficult judgements are often required: when is pricing 
below cost a sign of intense competition and when it is a sign of 
damaging anticompetitive behaviour? Up to a point, an abuse of 
dominance law has a powerful pro-competitive effect. Carried 
too far it can chill competition.
The merger proposal incident described above highlights the 
fact that some mergers can be anticompetitive and that this can 
often be their real motivation. When Australia introduced a trade 
practices law in 1965 it prohibited anticompetitive agreements 
but not mergers. This put an end to some price-fixing 
arrangements between competitors but they then nearly all 
merged, achieving the same effect as the former anticompetitive 
arrangements. This is one reason why merger provisions are 
needed and since 1974 have been part of Australian competition 
law – to prevent outlawed cartels from merging to become  
a monopoly.
Not all mergers are anticompetitive. Moreover, unlike cartels, 
they can bring efficiency benefits. Indeed it is possible under 
Australian law if a merger is anticompetitive to have it 
‘authorised’ if the applicants can demonstrate that the benefit 
to the public exceeds the harm. The job of the ACCC and its 
appeal body – the Australian Competition Tribunal – is to 
distinguish between those mergers between competitors which 
are of benefit to the public and those which are merely trumped 
up excuses for reducing competition in the Australian market.
Regarding the false claims about air transport, not only was this 
behaviour misleading and deceptive with respect to customers, it 
was also unfair for others in the industry who were ethical. It was 
a form of unfair competition. It did not enhance the industry’s 
reputation. It also meant that competition did not work well: 
competition only works well if consumers are informed properly 
or at least not wrongly informed about the nature of the products 
or services being offered on the market. Laws about misleading 
and deceptive conduct, and consumer protection more generally, 
are best regarded as a part of competition law, and in about half 
of the OECD countries, including Australia, they are administered 
and enforced by competition regulators. 
STUDENT ACTIVITIES
1.  Visit the ACCC website <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.
phtml/itemId/816373> and find definitions/explanations of the 
following terms: Cartel, Monopoly, Predatory Pricing, Merger, 
Exclusive Dealing, Resale Price Maintenance and the Trade 
Practices Act? 
2.  List some examples of the techniques used by businesses to reduce 
competition.
3.  What are some of the claimed benefits associated with company 
mergers?
4.  How might mergers bring about an anti competitive market?
5.  What were the ACCC’s reasons for banning the proposed 
airfreight merger? Do you agree with them?
6.  Why does competition law allow for the existence of monopolies?
7.  Explain why ‘monopolisation’ is seen as unlawful.
The preceding discussion leads us to a very brief summary  
of the basic elements of competition law.
Competition law applies to businesses (usually including 
publicly owned ones) and is designed to break up cartels, 
anticompetitive mergers, the abuse of market power (or 
dominance) and misleading and deceptive conduct. It takes the 
form of statutory prohibition both of:
a)  a general nature, for example all arrangements between 
businesses which substantially lessen competition are 
prohibited by law; and
b)  a specific nature, for example price fixing arrangements 
between competitors are automatically prohibited, 
irrespective of whether they affect competition. The reason 
for automatic prohibition is that the arrangements are 
assumed nearly always to be harmful to the economy and 
are rarely or ever offset by any benefits to the economy. 
Accordingly it is considered best to ban them automatically 
rather than consider the economic effects of each 
arrangement individually before banning them. Resale  
price maintenance is treated similarly.
Competition law is administered and applied by an independent 
regulator which has powers to investigate behaviour it believes 
may be unlawful.
In North America and Australia such regulators play a 
prosecutorial role: they collect evidence, seek to prove their 
case in court, and obtain court orders. In Europe the regulator 
itself may have power to make orders, including fines (although 
appeals may usually be made to a court).
Competition law can only work effectively if there are credible, 
adequate sanctions. Courts can impose injunctions, fines, gaol 
sentences, damages and other orders.
The penalties under the Trade Practices Act have until 2009 taken 
the form of fines and sometimes damages can be added on. But 
are fines sufficient in all situations? Recently Australia decided to 
join a number of other countries in having the possibility of jail 
sentences for collusion on prices, market sharing and bid rigging 
because fines alone were an insufficient deterrent. 
An important feature of competition law in North America and 
Australia is that it is also possible for individuals, including 
individual businesses, to take action themselves. They can sue 
for damages and injunctions (but not fines) in a court. This is 
a very important and powerful backup to competition law that 
usually works well.
Some features of competition law are:
• Most often the direct beneficiaries of enforcement action 
under the Trade Practices Act are businesses (especially 
small businesses) rather than consumers. On balance most 
businesses gain from competition law.
• In some areas, there is a fine line between competitive 
and anticompetitive behaviour. An example is when a 
monopolist reduces prices in response to entry by a new 
competitor.
• In other areas, there may be a trade off between competition 
and efficiency, for example, some mergers may allow 
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the achievement of scale economies at the expense of 
competition.
• The treatment of monopoly has some special features.  
As noted, monopoly itself is not unlawful. Monopoly 
may, after all, result from a firm being more efficient than 
any other competitor or potential competitor and thereby 
eliminating them. 
• In Australia there is no power to break up monopolies. 
In the United States the law goes a step further. There is 
power to break up a monopoly where it has actually acted 
anticompetitively in breach of competition law. There is, 
however, no power to break up a monopoly without there 
having been some anticompetitive behaviour.
• In competition law, there is normally no prohibition on the 
prices which a monopoly charges even if they are considered 
excessive.
• The law applies to all or nearly all forms of business. 
However, the millions of small businesses are generally 
unaffected by the law and/or are exempt when there is some 
possibility that a technicality might catch them. Of greater 
importance, however, is the fact that there is pressure from 
nearly every sector to gain exemptions from the law on the 
grounds that their circumstances are special. 
• In Australia we have an interesting way of dealing with 
claims for exemption. If someone believes that the law 
should not apply to them they may apply in public to the 
independent regulator (the ACCC) which holds a public 
hearing before deciding whether they should have so called 
‘authorisation’ to continue to engage in anticompetitive 
behaviour. This is an alarming sounding exception to the 
competition law but in practice the regulator has been 
extremely strict and does not grant many authorisations. 
• Anticompetitive behaviour can occur on a global scale but 
there is no global competition law or regulator. When a 
global cartel is detected, however, it is usually possible to 
obtain fines and damages at national levels: this is a reason 
why a domestic competition law is desirable. If the US, for 
example, uncovers a global cartel, a local regulator can often 
piggyback on its actions to obtain fines and damages where 
local harm has occurred providing there is a local law.
• A considerable administrative and legal apparatus is needed 
to apply competition law. It can take years to build up.
• Around the world the law has limited relevance to 
some important state-owned utilities in areas such as 
telecommunications, public transport, energy and water. 
Very often these are monopolies protected by statute 
from entry by competitors. Being a monopoly there is 
no competition to collude with, to take over or to take 
monopolisation action against. But having a protected 
monopoly can be economically harmful. To deal with it 
requires more than the application of competition law. 
• Competition law regulates anticompetitive behaviour by 
businesses. It does not apply to, nor override, the many 
actions of governments that limit competition. 
STUDENT ACTIVITIES
8.  Outline the purpose of competition law.
9.  What does this law prohibit?
10. What penalties can be applied under these laws? Explain some  
of the limitations of these penalties.
11. Why would possible gaol sentences be a greater deterrent than 
fines?
12. Explain why preventing mergers and the existence of monopolies 
could bring about a ‘less efficient’ economy?
13. What is the main weakness of trying to enforce competition law  
on a global basis?
14. Why is this law of limited relevance to some important state 
owned corporations?
Media Watch 
Visit the ACCC Media Centre by clicking on the following link: 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/2328>
Select one of the cases shown and prepare an oral presentation 
to your class which outlines why the business is being 
investigated or the subject of a report. 
You may also use newspapers, other media and sites such as 
You Tube to collect evidence of other businesses which may be 
under investigation for breaching competition laws. 
You Decide
A large paint retailer has approached you in your role as Chair 
of the ACCC about a proposed merger with another paint 
retailer. The result would be that the merged group would 
control over 50 per cent of the retail market in most of the 
major cities and towns around the country. The argument that 
they present is that this will result in them being able to acquire 
economies of scale, increased efficiency in buying power and 
reduced distribution costs for their goods and ultimately lower 
prices for consumers. Submissions from those opposed to the 
merger argue that it will lessen competition as the larger chains 
will force smaller competitors out of the market and ultimately 
result in higher prices for consumers.
What would you decide? In your answer include evidence from 
the article to support your views.
Further Reading
Brenchley. F, 2003, Allan Fels: A Portrait of Power, John Wiley & Sons, 
Milton. 
Miller, R., 2010, Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act – Australian 
Competition & Consumer Law, Thomson Reuters Lawbook Co., Australia.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 1999–2009, 
Annual Reports, ACCC, Canberra, available at < http://www.accc.gov.au/
content/index.phtml/itemId/668577>
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Resource Rent Tax became an issue of controversy and intense 
national debate after the 2 May 2010 National Budget, which 
culminated in the replacement of Australia’s Prime Minister. In 
this article, we outline the incidence of economic rent in natural 
resources in relation to a non-renewable (iron ore and coal) and 
a renewable natural resource (surface water). The rationale for 
imposing taxes and user charges to capture those rents in the 
public interest is then examined.
The concept of resource rent has its roots in the history of 
economic thought. Ricardo stated in the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation that rent is a payment for the ‘use of 
the original and indestructible powers of the soil’. Here, the 
term ‘soil’ implies all the natural resources embodied in land, 
unimproved by human effort. And in the current context, it 
would include the uses of land in relation to agriculture, energy, 
minerals, water, forestry, fisheries and for conservation. 
Land, as a natural endowment, or a gift of nature, has 
no production cost; it exists irrespective of its use and is 
immovable and indivisible in the sense that its supply is fixed. 
The price we pay for a parcel of land is for its ownership, and 
to secure access for its use. Because a parcel of land can be 
put to alternative uses, and its purpose varies between parcels, 
the price of land will vary reflecting its earning capacity and 
the level of demand. In rural uses, more fertile land and those 
carrying mineral deposits would fetch a higher price than those 
which are infertile or have no mineral deposits. On the other 
hand, in urban areas those close to amenities fetch higher prices, 
than those away from places of interest. Location, location!
Therefore, economists generally consider rent as a premium due 
to scarcity, owing to properties of the land that determine its 
productive potential in alternative uses. The price of land may 
therefore be expressed as a transfer price which permits  
the owner access to a stream of income, equivalent to its annual 
rent in perpetuity. This then is the capitalised value of the annual 
rent estimated by dividing the annual rent by the rate of interest. 
Some properties of land that earn this premium are 
indestructible – such as the location, topography, and some 
physical features; while others may not be depending on the 
nature of use. 
In regard to this capacity for land to undergo changes through 
use, economists consider resources in different categories. 
Renewable resources such as surface water or a fishery can 
regenerate themselves under a sustainable management regime. 
On the other hand, a mineral stock, such as coal or iron ore  
is non-renewable and exhaustible, as extraction can only be 
done once.
For a landowner considering alternative options to use a  
parcel of land, recognition of these resource characteristics  
are important in making better decisions.
The object of sustainable management of resources is to ensure 
an efficient flow of goods and services from the available fixed 
assets. For a resource owner this involves maximising the net 
benefits.
In considering one use, over other alternatives, the resource 
owner needs to consider the benefits in the best alternative use – 
the opportunity cost. The difference between these two entities 
– the rent and the opportunity cost, represents pure profits or 
economic rent from this allocation. 
Once the asset is allocated to a particular use, say mining or 
agriculture, the operation enters the production phase. Production 
involves the services of capital, labour and other ‘sacrificial’ 
inputs. The cost of these inputs and the supply price of the goods 
and services derived from production, say iron ore or farm 
outputs, will determine the nature of profits from production. 
Given world prices and competitive markets for inputs, the 
profitability of production is determined by the entrepreneurship, 
the way businesses are structured and risks are managed. Because 
the object of production is to maximise returns to production 
inputs, profitability is not predicated on the level of rent paid for 
transferring land into production. Of course, rent paid will have 
an impact on the level of net surplus that accrues to the mining 
operator, and they will ordinarily try hard to keep it.
The question is: who is the legitimate owner of these rents?
As the supply of land is fixed, and it being a gift of nature, rent 
derived from land is often regarded as a pure profit. As this 
portion of profit is not related to the entrepreneurial ability or  
the risk taking behaviour of investors, but purely reflects 
scarcity, it should fall in to the hands of the resource owner. It 
is a compensation for the resource owner for the loss of wealth 
from the depletion of the resource as a result of extraction.
The rent can therefore be appropriated by the owner of the 
resource, or the taxation authority where the natural resources 
are held in public ownership, without affecting the level of 
investment or production. As the Australian Constitution accords 
mineral rights to the States, taxes and royalties are levied by 
each State to recover these rents.
Then the next question is: how best to impose these taxes, in 
ways to meet the best social gain? The challenge is to let the 
goose that lays the golden eggs do her job.
Similar to a good old farmer who carefully nurtures his flock 
of geese, taxation authorities generally follow a number of 
accepted principles to minimise the tax burden on individuals 
and businesses:
• Equity – the principle of equality, whereby those taxpayers 
of similar financial means should pay similar amounts of tax. 
This includes progressive taxation where taxpayers of greater 
financial means pay at a higher rate than those with lower 
financial ability. 




Risk and Sustainable Management Group, School of Economics, The University of Queensland
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• Benefit – the concept of mutual benefits, that there should 
be some relationship between the tax paid and the benefits 
received by the taxpayer. 
• Capacity to pay – involves a degree of fairness, with regard 
to the ability of the taxpayer to pay the tax, taking account  
of the financial circumstances. 
• Efficiency – in regard to the desirability of the tax in terms 
of affecting taxpayers’ economic behaviour, such as business 
continuity and incentive for risk bearing. 
• Simplicity – in its definition so that the tax is readily 
understood and acceptable, and unambiguous, enabling ease 
of collection and administration. 
Having considered the above, a resource rent tax on minerals 
is widely accepted as an efficient tax, as is well-argued in the 
Henry Tax Review. The Review remarked that the new tax:
‘… would enable the community to collect a greater 
and constant share of the return on its non-renewable 
resources. It would also promote an efficient level 
of output by reducing distortions to investment and 
production decisions as well as reducing sovereign risk 
over the long term.’
As Ross Garnaut1 has emphasized in his recent lecture, ‘mineral 
taxation is an area in which the identification of rent has a clear 
and practical meaning’, because improper identification and 
specification of the tax can violate the above stated principles 
and diminish its policy credentials. 
As identified earlier, because the rent represents the loss of 
wealth from the extraction of the resource, the most efficient 
way to tax mineral resources is by levying it on the value of  
the minerals at the mine gate.
It appears that the proposed Mineral Resource Tax is consistent 
with these principles. With the demand for mineral resources 
forecast to increase, in keeping with recent trends (Figure 1), the 
timing of the tax seems appropriate.
STUDENT ACTIVITIES
1.  Use the article and your text to find definitions and examples of  
the following terms:
 • Natural resources
 • Renewable and non-renewable resources 
 • Public interest
 • Transfer price
2.  Explain in your own words what David Ricardo meant by the term 
resource rent.
3.  According to the writer, why does the value of land vary?
4.  Explain why the ‘price of land can be expressed as a transfer price’.
5.  What do pure profits or economic rents represent?
6.  Why would the States prefer the current system of taxes and 
royalties to the proposed Federal Government Mining Resource 
Tax? 
7.  Why is the Henry Resource Rent Tax claimed to be a more 
‘efficient’ system of taxing the mining industry?
Water Allocation In The Murray-
Darling Basin
Water has been another issue of public controversy over recent 
years as growing demand and supply constraints under climate 
variability have increased the scarcity of water across all uses. 
Now let’s look at the way in which irrigation water has been 
allocated in Australia, and how recent reform has affected the 
way it is being priced.
In contrast to other minerals, water is movable, as it flows 
naturally, and can be used repeatedly, albeit with some losses 
and depletion in quality. For practical purposes, water is 
considered a renewable resource.
Because water is naturally mobile, property rights to water 
were traditionally attached to land where water was used. In 
the Murray-Darling Basin, for example, irrigation licences 
have been tied to the land making them exclusive and non-
transferable as a separate asset, but providing a source of 











 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10
Figure 1: Recent mineral exports 
Source: ABARE
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reliable supply enabling a guaranteed source of income. This 
was consistent with the social objectives of development of 
irrigated agriculture as a central component of the policies of 
closer settlement and national development that were adopted 
from the nineteenth century to the late twentieth century.
Around 1980, serious concerns about the social costs of land 
degradation and river salinity, toxic algal blooms and rising 
budgetary costs in maintaining public irrigation systems led 
to a rethinking of ways to manage water resources to improve 
net social benefits. In particular, the Council of Australian 
Governments (CoAG)-led National Competition Reforms in 
1993/94 sought to make the water industry more competitive 
by introducing a series of institutional reforms. The focus was 
to achieve an efficient allocation and management of water by 
allowing markets to play a greater role in providing signals 
about the value of water.
The key steps in this reform were:
a.  separation of titles allowing flexibility for the transfer  
of water licences independent of the land title;
b.  introducing a cap on diversions at catchment levels; 
c.  creation of water markets that allow the sale of water 
allocations and water licences; and
d.  a move to full cost recovery pricing, whereby implied 
subsidies on water are removed.
These reforms were also accompanied by investment in 
irrigation infrastructure and incentives for improving water 
use efficiency. In more recent times, a program to buy back 
water entitlements and a Basin Plan that defines sustainable 
diversion limits have provided a means to define an exclusive 
environmental allocation.
While a move toward full cost recovery has provided better 
price signals to users, at present these charges do not include  
an explicit resource rent tax component. However, the 
differences in water charges levied on irrigators and the prices 
realised through water trading provide a useful indictor of the 
nature of rents available to water entitlement holders. Future 
increases in demand for water and greater restrictions being 
imposed with the introduction of sustainable diversion limits 
will likely increase these rents. 
While there is no resource rent tax on water, in a number of 
jurisdictions explicit environmental management charges are 
levied on water consumed. But it is not clear whether the  
levels of these charges are proportional to the external costs 
imposed by water users on other parties. The new Basin water 
planning and management charge rules that will apply from  
1 July 2011 may provide greater transparency in the application  
of these charges.
However, environmental charges may not be suitable for all 
water-related externalities and there are numerous difficulties 
in appropriately defining such charges in a way that provides 
incentives for private parties to act in the social interest. For 
these reasons it is unlikely that taxes that relate to resource 
rents or those directly addressing environmental externalities 
would become preferred policy choices in sustainable water 
management.
Rather, as scarcity of water continues to intensify there will 
be greater pressure to eliminate existing barriers for water 
trade and to use explicit measures to address environmental 
considerations. Water allocation is clearly an area where the 
use of economic instruments is proving to be more effective in 
meeting efficiency and equity considerations in natural resource 
management.
The volume of interstate trade increased from around 70 
gigalitres in 2004–05 to 235 gigalitres in 2007–08, representing 
18 per cent of the total traded volume. The price of water 
allocations was highly variable in 2007–08, both within and 
between trading zones, ranging from around $200 to $1200 per 
megalitre, about 4 to 15 times the administered water charges. 
Recent experience with water trading has highlighted the benefits 
of water trading in improving overall water productivity. The 
benefits of conserving water have increased because of the 
drought and the resulting increase in temporary water prices. 
As irrigators widely recognise the scarcity of water, efforts 
to improve on-farm water use efficiency have enabled many 
irrigators to avoid serious losses in severe drought conditions.
STUDENT ACTIVITIES
8.  Why is water considered to be a renewable resource?
9.  By 1980, it became necessary to rethink the way we manage  
water resources. Why was this so?
10.  Why were the key water reforms introduced?
11.  How has the use of water changed since these reforms have been 
put in place?
Class Debate
‘Our minerals belong to all Australians – not just the mining 
companies and their shareholders’.
Divide into teams to debate the above proposition. To assist  
you in preparing your arguments visit the following websites:
The Minerals Council of Australia website and read its views 
about the proposed tax changes <www.minerals.org.au/>
Prime Ministers statement on proposed Mining Resource Rent 
Tax <http://www.pm.gov.au/node/6868> and <www.futuretax.
gov.au/pages/default.aspx>
Notes
1 The new Australian Resource Rent Tax, www.rossgarnaut.com.au ;
 Also check www.johnquiggin.com for commentaries on both the resource 
tax and water management issues.
The Australian Economy 2010–11 (Martin et al) and 
Australian Economic Statistics 2010–11 (Robert Prince)  
available online at www.warringalpublications.com.au
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Media Watch
by Ted Kramer
Reserve Bank Of Australia, 
Speeches, Recent Developments
By Glenn Stevens, 9 June 2010
Extract from Page 2, paragraphs 6, 7and 8
www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2010/
Turning then to the recent events in Europe, it is worth 
asking at the outset how these countries arrived at their 
current position. The story has many nuances by country but 
broadly, the public debt relative to GDP has long tended to 
be on the high side in Europe. It generally ratcheted up in 
successive economic downturns over the past three or four 
decades and efforts to get it down in the good times had only 
modest success. For some countries that joined the euro area 
the substantial fall in borrowing costs they enjoyed masked 
a degree of vulnerability, in that their fiscal sustainability 
depended partly on being able to continue borrowing cheaply. 
Demographic trends – pronounced in Europe, with some 
countries already experiencing declining populations – further 
highlight the problem. A high debt burden is much more easily 
managed in countries with higher potential growth prospects, 
one driver of which is population growth. 
This problem was slowly but steadily accumulating over many 
years. Then the financial crisis occurred. There was a deep 
recession from which recovery is not yet entrenched. Budget 
deficits rose sharply as a result – reaching 10 per cent of annual 
GDP or more in a number of instances. The prospect of adding 
that much to the debt stock each year for even just a few 
years can make a difference to assessments of sustainability 
even for strong countries. For the not-quite-so-strong cases, 
markets began to signal unease. Borrowing costs rose for those 
countries, which of course makes the fiscal situation worse. 
And so on. 
Initially the effect of these developments on financial markets 
was very much confined to Europe. Wider effects were observed 
in May as global investors became more cautious. Uncertainty 
over the nature of the policy response, and fears that it could 
be un-coordinated across countries, saw a marked increase in 
volatility in share prices and exchange rates. Our own markets 
have been affected along with everyone else’s. 
STUDENT ACTIVITIES
1.  Identify one reason why the countries of Europe have 
‘arrived at their current position’.
2.  Explain why a ‘substantial fall in borrowing costs’can lead  
to problems in a country’s fiscal sustainability.
3.  Explain how demographic trends can affect a country’s  
fiscal sustainability.
4.  Explain how the financial crisis exacerbated the situation.
5.  Analyse the effect of these events in Europe on the global 
economy.
Rio Profit Boost A Hint At Tax 
Millions To Come
By Malcolm Maiden, August 7, 2010
Sydney Morning Herald, Weekend Business,  
Page 3 (Extract)
We are going to have to wait a few years to see exactly how 
successful Labor’s downsized mining tax is, or, to take the 
opposite view, how much damage it does to mining profits.
But this week’s June half-profit result from a rebounding Rio 
Tinto gave some clues. If the tax had already been in, Rio would 
have paid more. But it’s not clear whether the big miners are 
generating the income the government expects in a couple of 
year’s time.
The final, fine detail of the tax is a work in progress and will 
depend to an extent on choices each mining company makes.
The campaign against the ‘mini-me’ tax that is coming from 
smaller iron ore miners in the west could see it trimmed even 
further, through the exclusion of magnetite iron ore operations, 
for example.
Unlike the rich haematite deposits in the Pilbara, magnetite is not 
just dug up and shipped. It is subjected to a magnetic separation 
process first and can be compared with the conversion of bauxite 
to alumina, minerals excluded in the mining tax re-write.
The revised tax applies only to iron ore, coal and, in a parallel 
stream, oil and gas. Its base rate is 22.5 per cent – 30 per cent of 
75 per cent of the gross operating profits of the mines – and the 
amount miners pay will depend on their mining costs, how much 
they are investing and on which of two options they choose when 
they enter the tax regime in 2012–13.
The miners can leave the balance-sheet value of their mining 
assets unchanged, in which case they will be able to depreciate 
them over five years, and they will be taxed only on profits that 
exceed a hurdle rate equal to the long-term Commonwealth bond 
rate plus 7 per cent (about 12 per cent currently).
Or they can rebook their assets to market value. If they do that 
there will be no hurdle rate and they will be required to depreciate 
the mine assets much more gradually, up to a 25-year mine life.
The Rio profit and the preponderance of earnings in the two 
divisions targeted by the tax suggests that the government is 
in the hunt to get the $10.5 billion it is budgeting for from the 
tax – $4 billion in 2012–13 and $6.5 billion in 2013–14 – three-
quarters or more of which will come from the two majors.
STUDENT ACTIVITIES
1.  What are the main companies and resources affected by the 
new tax?
2.  What are the resources that are already taxed in a similar way?
3.  Explain, in general terms, how the tax can be calculated.
4.  How much revenue is likely to be generated by the new tax?
